This paper focuses on new characterizations of convex interval games using the notions of exactness and superadditivity. We also relate big boss interval games with concave interval games and obtain characterizations of big boss interval games in terms of exactness and subadditivity.
Introduction
Convex interval games were introduced in Alparslan Gök, Branzei and Tijs (2008a) , where also several characterizations of this class of games are provided (see Theorems 3.1, 4.1 and 5.2). Our aim is to extend the list of existing characterizations of convex interval games by using properties of their subgames and marginal games. S . For T ⊂ N , the marginal game of v based on T is defined by v T (S) = v(S ∪ T ) − v(T ) for each S ⊂ N \ T . Convex games are balanced games, i.e. the core (Gillies (1959) ) of such a game is nonempty, where the core C(v) of v ∈ G N is defined by
It is well known that: subgames of convex games are also convex (and subgames of concave games are also concave); convex games are exact games and total exact games (i.e. games whose all subgames are also exact) are convex (Biswas et al. (1999) , Azrieli and Lehrer (2007) ); games whose marginal games are all superadditive are convex (Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs (2004) , Martinez-Legaz (1997 , 2006 ). Let v ∈ G N and n ∈ N . Then, this game is a (total) big boss game with n as a big boss if the following conditions are satisfied:
The next two propositions and the definition of suitable marginal games for big boss games are obtained from Propositions 2 and 3 in Branzei, Dimitrov and Tijs (2006) with {n} in the role of C.
> is a total big boss game with big boss n if and only if the marginal game < N \ {n} , v {n} > is a concave game.
Here, M V N,{n} is the set of all monotonic games on N satisfying the big boss property with respect to the big boss n. Given a game < N, v >∈ M V N,{n} and a coalition T ∈ 2 N \{n} , the n-based T -marginal game (
Then the following assertions are equivalent: (i) < N, v > is a (total) big boss game with big boss n;
{n} > is a concave game;
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall basic definitions and results for cooperative interval games which are used in Sections 3 and 4. In Section 3, we define superadditive, exact and marginal interval games and give new characterizations of convex interval games using the notions of exactness and superadditivity. A theoretical application of these new characterizations of convex interval games is provided in Section 4. Specifically, we relate big boss interval games with concave interval games and obtain characterizations for big boss interval games using the notions of exactness and subadditivity. Big boss interval games are introduced in Alparslan Gök, Branzei and Tijs (2008b) , where some characterizations of this class of games are provided (see Propositions 3.1, 3.2 and Theorems 3.1, 3.2).
Preliminaries on cooperative interval games
A cooperative interval game in coalitional form (Alparslan Gök, Miquel and Tijs (2008)) is an ordered pair < N, w > where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players, and w : 2 N → I(R) is the characteristic function such that w(∅) = [0, 0], where I(R) denotes the set of all closed intervals in R. For each S ∈ 2 N , the worth set (or worth interval) w(S) of the coalition S in the interval game < N, w > is of the form [w(S), w(S)], where w(S) is the lower bound and w(S) is the upper bound of w(S). We denote by IG N the family of all cooperative interval games with player set N . Some classical T U -games associated with an interval game w ∈ IG N play a key role, namely the border games < N, w >, < N, w > and the length game < N, |w| >, where |w| (S) = w(S) − w(S) for each S ∈ 2 N . For the theory of cooperative interval games interval calculus (Moore (1979) ) is a basic tool. Let I, J ∈ I(R) with I = I, I , J = J, J , |I| = I − I and α ∈ R + . Then, I + J = I + J, I + J and αI = αI, αI . The partial substraction operator I − J is defined, only if |I| ≥ |J|, by I − J = I − J, I − J . We say that I is weakly better than J, which we denote by I J, if and only if I ≥ J and I ≥ J. We also use the reverse notation J I, if and only if J ≤ I and J ≤ I. We denote by I(R) N the set of all n-dimensional vectors whose elements belong to I(R). For a game w ∈ IG N and a coalition S ∈ 2 N \ {∅}, the interval subgame with player set T is the game w T defined by w T (S) = w(S) for all S ∈ 2 T , i.e. w T is the restriction of w to the set 2 T . We call a game < N, w > supermodular if
We call a game w ∈ IG N convex if < N, w > is supermodular and its length game < N, |w| > is also supermodular. We denote by CIG N the class of convex interval games with player set N . An interval game < N, w > is called concave if < N, w > and < N, |w| > are submodular, i.e. w(S) (ii) A game < N, w > is convex if and only if its length game < N, |w| > and its border games < N, w >, < N, w > are convex;
(iii) A game < N, w > is convex if and only if its border game < N, w > and the game < N, w − w > are convex.
We call a game < N, w > a big boss interval game if its border game < N, w > and the game < N, |w| > are classical (total) big boss games. We denote by BBIG N the set of all big boss interval games with player set N (without loss of generality we denote the big boss by n). The interval core C(w) of the interval game w, is defined by
We call a game < N, w > size monotonic if < N, |w| > is monotonic, i.e. |w| (S) ≤ |w| (T ) for all S, T ∈ 2 N with S ⊂ T . We denote by SM IG N the class of size monotonic interval games with player set N . Denote by Π(N ) the set of permutations σ : N → N . Let w ∈ SM IG N and σ ∈ Π(N ). The interval marginal vector of w with respect to σ, m σ (w), corresponds to a situation, where the players enter a room one by one in the order σ(1), σ(2), . . . , σ(n) and each player is given the marginal contribution he/she creates by entering. We denote the set of predecessors of i in σ by P σ (i) = {r ∈ N |σ −1 (r) < σ −1 (i)}, where σ −1 (i) denotes the entrance number of player i, and define m σ i (w) = w(P σ (i) ∪ {i}) − w(P σ (i)) for each i ∈ N.
Two characterizations of convex interval games
We call a game w ∈ IG N superadditive if for all S, T ⊂ N with S ∩ T = ∅,
w(S ∪ T ) w(S) + w(T ); (1) |w| (S ∪ T ) ≥ |w| (S) + |w| (T ). (2)
Remark 3.1. First, we note that (1) is equivalent to the superadditivity of the lower game and the upper game. Additionally, notice that, by Proposition 2.1, if w ∈ CIG N , then < N, w > is superadditive; further, < N, |w| >, < N, w > and < N, w > are superadditive. Proof. Let w ∈ CIG N . Then, < N, w > and < N, |w| > are supermodular. From this we obtain the supermodularity of < N \ T, w T > as follows. Take
Similarly, the supermodularity (convexity) of < N \ T, w T > follows from the supermodularity (convexity) of < N, |w| >. Hence, w T ∈ CIG N \T .
Theorem 3.1. Let w ∈ IG N . Then, the following assertions are equivalent:
Proof. First, we notice that by Proposition 2.1 w ∈ CIG N if and only if < N, w >, < N, w > and < N, |w| > are convex games. Now, using the characterization of classical convex games based on the superadditivity of marginal games (Branzei an exact game. In the sequel, we prove that a similar characterization holds true in the interval data setting. We call a game w ∈ IG N an exact interval game if for each S ∈ 2 N :
(i) there exists I = (I 1 , . . . , I n ) ∈ C(w) such that i∈S I i = w(S);
(ii) there exists x ∈ C(|w|) such that i∈S x i = |w| (S).
Note that (ii) expresses the exactness of the lenght game < N, |w| >.
Proposition 3.2. Each convex interval game w ∈ IG N is an exact interval game.
Proof. This follows basically from the fact that m σ (w) ∈ C(w) for each σ ∈ Π(N ). So, let S = {s 1 , . . . , s k } and σ ∈ Π(N ) be such that σ(r) = s r for r = 1, . . . , k. Then, i∈S m σ i (w) = w(S). Further, the convexity of w ∈ IG N implies that < N, |w| > is convex and consequently it is an exact game, i.e. for each S ∈ 2 N there exists x ∈ C(|w|) such that i∈S x i = |w| (S).
Remark 3.2. For a given S ∈ 2 N and I = (I 1 , . . . , I n ) ∈ C(w), i∈S I i = w(S) also delivers (I 1 , . . . , I n ) ∈ C(w), (I 1 , . . . , I n ) ∈ C(w) and (I 1 − I 1 , . . . , I n − I n ) ∈ C(|w|), with i∈S I i = w(S), i∈S I i = w(S) and i∈S (I i − I i ) = |w| (S). This can be used for extending the characterization of Biswas et al. (1999) to interval games. 
Proof. (i) → (ii) follows from Proposition 3.2 because each subgame of a convex interval game is convex, and hence exact.
(ii) → (i) From the exactness of each interval subgame < T, w T > we obtain that < N, w T >, < N, w T > and < N, |w| T > are exact games for each T ⊂ N . Now, we use the result of Biswas et al. (1999) and obtain that the games < N, w T >, < N, w T > and < N, |w T | > are all convex. By Proposition 2.1 we obtain that w ∈ CIG N .
4 An application
The two characterizations of convex interval games provided by Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 are interesting from the theoretical point of view. In this section we use them to derive new characterizations of big boss interval games based on the notions of subadditivity and exactness.
Remark 4.1. In view of Theorem 3.1 we obtain that a game w ∈ IG N is concave if and only if for each T ∈ 2 N the marginal interval game < N \ T, w T > is subadditive.
Remark 4.2. In view of Theorem 3.2, a game w ∈ IG N is concave if and only if < T, w T > is exact for each T ⊂ N .
We denote by M IG
N,{n} the set of all monotonic interval games on N that satisfy the big boss property with respect to n (the big boss player). Proof. Let w ∈ BBIG N . By Proposition 2.2 this is equivalent to < N, w >, < N, w > and < N, |w| > being (total) big boss games with n as a big boss, which holds, by Proposition 1.1, if and only if < N \ {n} , w {n} >, < N \ {n} , w {n} > and < N \ {n} , |w| {n} > are concave, which is equivalent with the marginal game < N \{n} , w {n} > being a concave interval game.
Proposition 4.2. Let w ∈ M IG N,{n} . Then, the following assertions are equivalent:
(ii) Each marginal interval game of < N \ {n} , w {n} > is subadditive.
(iii) Each (interval) subgame of < N \ {n} , w {n} > is exact.
Proof. for each S ⊂ N \ T . Based on the characterization of big boss interval games using its border and length games we can easily extend Proposition 1.2 from classical cooperative games to cooperative interval games. 
